

Hiroshima Round Table 2018

Chairman's Statement

August 22-23, 2018
Hiroshima, Japan

Hiroshima suffered from the first use of an atomic weapon. The overriding goal of the Hiroshima Round Table is to ensure that Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the last cities ever to suffer from an attack by atomic or nuclear weapons.

Participants in the 2018 Hiroshima Round Table noted the high discomfort level in most countries of the world with the continued existence of nuclear weapons and accompanying doctrines of the use of nuclear weapons. The sense of discomfort has increased over the last four years with the growing normalization of the discourse of nuclear-weapon based national security policies. This discomfort has found expression in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the United Nations in July 2017.

Our task is to show a concrete path to be taken to achieve the shared goal of national and collective security free of the existence, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Hiroshima Round Table believes that this task should be pursued through the three pathways, with specific proposals concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as outlined in this Chairman's Statement.

I. Reducing and abolishing nuclear weapons

The fundamental premise behind the call to reduce and abolish nuclear weapons is simple but powerful: the use of nuclear weapons against civilians is a crime. The risks inherent in the continued existence of nuclear weapons, that they will someday be used through deliberate intent, by accident, rogue launch, or system malfunction, or through the logic of an escalation spiral, are real but unacceptable because of the gravity of the horrific consequences. Accordingly, we propose the following.

- All nuclear armed states must affirm the continuing validity and relevance of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that a nuclear war can never be won and therefore must never be fought.
- All nuclear armed states should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy, and not create new roles for them.
- The stalled nuclear arms control agenda must be restarted, with negotiations for reductions in global nuclear stockpiles, postures and deployment practices, along with specific adaptation of such agreements for the Asia Pacific.
- Preventing the collapse of the INF Treaty and universalizing it progressively, extending New START by another five years, completing the ratifications required to bring the CTBT into force, and commencing negotiations on a Fissile Materials

Cut-off Treaty, are examples of concrete actions to restore faith in the so-called step-by-step or progressive nuclear arms control agenda.

II. Reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence

Security of a nation need not, and should not, depend on nuclear deterrence. In order to succeed in the task of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, we must make sincere efforts to appreciate under what circumstances, and against which contingencies, the national security planners of the nuclear armed and umbrella states believe that nuclear deterrence is credible and works.

We must then make equally sincere efforts to identify and recommend similarly credible and practical non-nuclear-weapon alternatives for safeguarding the threats to the national security of the nuclear armed states and the nuclear umbrella states. In order to do this, nuclear armed states must:

- Undertake a realistic assessment of the risks of nuclear-weapon use, by intention or inadvertently, that are built into nuclear deterrence postures;
- Strengthen strategic reassurance of allies under the nuclear umbrella through agreements, commitments, and deployments of conventional forces;
- Strengthen deterrent capabilities and postures of conventional forces so that they progressively take over the functions currently tasked to nuclear weapons;
- Reaffirm the applicability of international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of non-combatant immunity, proportionality and necessity, to all military doctrines including nuclear doctrines.
- We encourage nuclear armed states to sign the protocols to nuclear weapon free zones.

III. Reducing risks of nuclear-weapon use

The tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reaffirms our conviction that nuclear weapons should never be used again in the world. An increasingly hostile security environment, proliferation of nuclear weapons and emergence of new technologies have all increased the risk of accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons.

The Hiroshima Roundtable expresses great concern at efforts by nuclear weapon states to increase the role of nuclear arms in response to non-nuclear arms states, lower the threshold for their use, and expand the use of nuclear threats. To reduce such risks, we propose the following.

- Nuclear armed states must commit to No First Use of nuclear weapons, and to enshrine such unilateral declarations and search for possibilities for bilateral and multilateral agreements in domestic law.

- The nuclear armed and umbrella states of the Asia Pacific region should institute strategic policy dialogues (a) among nuclear allies, and (b) between potential nuclear adversaries, in order to enhance transparency, reduce the trust deficits, and promote mutual confidence.
- We encourage the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions of high tensions and conflict history.
- All nuclear armed states have undertaken modernization and upgrades of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and infrastructure. Confidence building and risk reduction measures, however, have not kept pace with developments in technology and resulting adjustments to nuclear postures. Nuclear armed states must address this agenda immediately.
- The US and the Soviet Union created the Incidents at Sea Agreement in the 1970s, and the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement in the 1980s. These agreements need to be modernized to cover current US–Russia relations today. Similar negotiations must also be started between other nuclear armed states, for example China and the US, and India and Pakistan, in order to reduce nuclear risks.
- All states should commit never to use cyber capabilities to subvert or sabotage nuclear weapon systems.

IV. Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Both summit meetings in April and June 2018 affirmed the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The points of agreement as stated in the joint statement at the Singapore summit, however, falls short of concrete measures in achieving that goal. The Hiroshima Roundtable, while welcoming the new dialogue, believes that further measures must be taken to bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and achieve peace that is not dependent on nuclear weapons in the Asia Pacific region.

- The Hiroshima Round Table applauds the dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
- We expect that there will be elements of reciprocity as they negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the balance between the actions of both sides for the process to be sustainable. Sanctions relief should be tied to progress in denuclearization.
- The denuclearization agenda cannot be dealt with as an isolated issue but has to be handled in the overall context of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region. Creation of a nuclear free zone should be an integrated part of an overall regional security architecture for peace and security in the Northeast Asian region.
- We encourage studies on the practical steps to facilitate the denuclearization process and to help building peace and economic reconstruction on the Peninsula.
- Denuclearization will require engagement and cooperation from a broad range of states, in particular the participants of the Six Party Talks.
- The East Asia region suffers from a paucity of security architecture to manage nuclear risks in the region. In this light, we urge governments to establish a

multinational security architecture such as a Northeast Asia security community which includes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a multinational venue for conflict management and confidence building that includes but extends beyond the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The denuclearization agenda must be addressed as part of continued efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2020, the next NPT Review Conference will be held on the fiftieth anniversary of the NPT entering into force. This is an appropriate time, therefore, to mark the major role of the NPT as the normative framework underpinning the global nuclear order, and to reaffirm the original NPT vision of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Participants in the 2018 Hiroshima Round Table look forward to the 2020 Review Conference adopting practical steps to realize the fifty-year old commitment by the international community to implementing the individual and collective responsibility of nuclear disarmament.