

Recommendations of the 2026 Hiroshima Roundtable

From Hiroshima, a city that has experienced the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use, the Hiroshima Roundtable seeks to connect that experience to today's nuclear dangers. Those dangers are increasingly entangled with conventional war, emerging technologies, the erosion of accountable governance, and the humanitarian consequences borne by affected communities. These recommendations focus on measures where action is possible now: preventing nuclear use, strengthening rules and norms, and reducing the risks of escalation and unconstrained competition. The TPNW has sharpened international attention to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use and the needs of affected communities, even as states continue to differ over nuclear deterrence and the Treaty itself. The focus here is on areas where those differences need not prevent action. Hiroshima's message should be more than a reminder of nuclear devastation. It should inform how governments and societies respond to the risks that could lead to nuclear use. Participants of the Hiroshima Roundtable discussed the recommendations that follow, which set out practical steps to reduce those risks and to provide a robust foundation for a world without nuclear weapons.

FOUNDATIONS Cross-Cutting Principles

- F1 Prevent armed conflict before managing escalation.** Preventing armed conflict is the core responsibility of states. They should settle disputes peacefully, contain military incidents at an early stage, and exercise restraint across the conventional, cyber and space domains, where escalation can rapidly acquire a nuclear dimension.
- F2 Reaffirm nuclear non-use as the baseline.** All states should reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Nuclear-armed states should shape their doctrine, signaling, exercises and procedures to strengthen the barriers against the use of nuclear weapons and to reduce the risks of accident, miscalculation and unauthorized action.
- F3 Make risks and responsibilities visible.** Nuclear-armed states, in accordance with their national legislation, should increase transparency on nuclear holdings, doctrine and declaratory policy, and report more systematically on nuclear risk-reduction efforts.
- F4 Uphold the pillars of the non-proliferation regime.** States should uphold their NPT commitments, pursue the entry into force of the CTBT, strengthen IAEA safeguards, and restore credibility to the NPT review process. Practical dialogue between the NPT and TPNW communities should be maintained on their shared objectives and areas of complementarity.
- F5 Recognize the broader linkages.** Journalists, educators, students, researchers and civil society should examine the connections between nuclear weapons and conventional war, artificial intelligence, energy, the erosion of accountable governance, and human rights, and should call for government

policies to take those linkages explicitly into account.

BASKET 1 PREVENTING NUCLEAR USE AND ESCALATION

- 1.1 Reject nuclear threats and normalization of any nuclear use, including “limited” nuclear use.** Nuclear-armed states should reject explicit threats, nuclear coercion, and rhetoric portraying nuclear use as limited or manageable.
- 1.2 Preserve meaningful human control over nuclear decision-making, in particular amid the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI).** Decision-makers should have time to reflect, consult other people, supported by fail-safe, auditable, and redundant procedures, and retain boundaries on the role AI plays.
- 1.3 Refrain from interference with nuclear command and control and early warning.** Nuclear-armed states should exercise reciprocal restraint against deliberate cyber or counter-space interference with nuclear command, control and communications, early-warning systems and relevant dual-use assets critical to those functions. To prevent escalation stemming from the difficulty of distinguishing attacks on non-nuclear targets from attacks on NC3, nuclear-armed states must commit to the physical and architectural de-entanglement of nuclear and conventional C2/C3 systems.
- 1.4 Maintain crisis-management channels in all circumstances.** Leader-level, diplomatic and military channels for incident management should remain available, and should be tested, even during severe confrontation or armed conflict.
- 1.5 Emphasize regional risk-reduction measures.** States should establish practical risk-reduction measures such as hotlines, advance notification of missile launches, military deconfliction and operational restraints around sensitive areas. Such measures should build on existing arrangements where possible; risk reduction need not wait for political reconciliation.

BASKET 2 UPHOLDING RULES, NORMS AND REGIMES

- 2.1 Strengthen the norm against attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and associated personnel.** States should refrain from attacking civilian nuclear facilities in armed conflict, including kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, should protect essential supporting infrastructure and associated personnel, and ensure reliable communication and incident notification. Track 1.5 and Track 2 processes should explore how such practices can reinforce broader international norms.
- 2.2 Prepare for radiological emergencies across borders.** Neighboring states, operators and international organizations should maintain emergency contacts, compatible monitoring and notification, and coordinated plans for public communication, protective action and cross-border response.
- 2.3 Prevent a return to nuclear testing.** All nuclear-armed states should declare and reaffirm test moratoria, uphold the norm embodied in the CTBT, and support the CTBTO and its International Monitoring System.

- 2.4 Restore verification where it has broken down.** Where access, monitoring or reliable baseline data has been lost due to the end of arms control treaties, restoring credible treaty verification should be the priority. Interim verifiable limits and reciprocal steps can contain risk; where established mechanisms cannot operate, states should maintain credible multilateral monitoring and transparent reporting.
- 2.5 Maintain responsible standards of nuclear supply and sensitive technology transfer.** All states should join the Additional Protocol and strengthen effective IAEA monitoring and appropriate controls on sensitive fuel-cycle technologies. Peaceful nuclear cooperation should strengthen confidence in the non-proliferation regime.
- 2.6 Support multilateral arms control and disarmament initiatives.** States should provide political, financial and technical support for multilateral arms control and disarmament initiatives by intergovernmental organizations such as the IAEA and the CTBTO, as well as non-governmental organizations and educational institutions providing disarmament and non-proliferation training.

BASKET 3 PREVENTING UNCONSTRAINED NUCLEAR COMPETITION

- 3.1 Halt further nuclear expansion.** Upholding existing agreements is necessary but not sufficient. States should pursue practical measures to halt the quantitative and qualitative expansion of nuclear capabilities, including by nuclear-armed states outside the recognized NPT nuclear-weapon-state framework.
- 3.2 Prevent a permanent vacuum in strategic arms control.** The United States and Russia should establish reciprocal interim restraints, preserve or restore notifications and data exchanges where feasible, and work toward a verifiable successor framework. Wider political disputes should not block measures that increase predictability. The United States and China should engage in sustained dialogue on doctrine, crisis stability, practical reciprocal restraints, and risk reduction.
- 3.3 Strengthen N5 strategic dialogue and risk reduction.** The five NPT nuclear-weapon states should sustain structured dialogue based on mutual respect despite wider political differences, including on doctrine, force developments, exercise transparency, missile-launch notification, testing restraint, crisis communication and measures reducing incentives for first use or launch under warning, as well as a reciprocal N5 pledge of no-first-(cyber-)strike against NC3 assets. Other nuclear-armed states should engage in similar risk-reduction measures.
- 3.4 Renew the disarmament bargain.** Nuclear-weapon states should connect risk reduction to the NPT Article VI obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament by reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons and by increasing predictability regarding their policies and forces.